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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As of May 2007, SEPTA has a budget shortfall of $129.6 million.  Without a source of funding that can
balance the transit organization's budget this summer, SEPTA would be forced to implement "Plan B,"
which would cut service by 20 percent and increase fares by 31 percent.
The Economy League worked with Econsult Corporation to analyze the economic impacts of Plan B on
individuals, businesses, governments and the region's overall competitiveness.  The analysis builds upon
generally accepted data sets and research models including SEPTA's ridership figures, Delaware Valley
Planning Commission (DVRPC) congestion modeling, Philadelphia Tax Reform Commission work, and U.S.
Census data.
The Economy League’s analysis found that the "Plan B" service cuts and fare increases would:
Cost current transit riders an additional $182 million annually. These costs would come
from $68 million in additional fares, $92 million in wait times, and $22 million in new travel costs to
transit riders who opt for their cars. A typical transit rider would pay an additional $1.20 per day to
commute.
Cost current drivers an additional $38.9 million annually. This figure includes $24.5 million in
additional travel time due to increased traffic congestion and an additional $14.4 million in parking prices
for commuters traveling to Center City. A typical commuter would pay an additional $1.06 per day to park
in Center City.
Result in the City of Philadelphia losing 43,800 jobs and $1.67 billion in net earnings,
and the five counties of Southeastern Pennsylvania losing 14,500 jobs and $868.5 million in
net earnings.1
Depreciate property values in Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery Counties by 6.6
percent, a net value reduction of $4.45 billion. A  typical  suburban  home  would  lose  $6,867  in
value. Moreover, inner ring suburban communities, which share the city’s transit orientation and are
intrinsically linked to its economy, would experience similar economic impacts to those realized in the
city.
Depreciate city property values by 6.5 percent, a net value reduction of $2.89 billion. A typical
city home would lose $7,431 in value.
Reduce State Personal Income Tax revenues by $27 million.
Reduce City Wage Tax revenues by $60 million. Additionally, depreciating property values would
squeeze the budgets of school districts that rely on property taxes for revenue.
Strain the ability of suburban municipalities to provide residents with core services. Service
cuts and fare increases encourage sprawling growth patterns, which put an additional burden
on suburban municipalities by requiring them to provide more services over a larger area. Combined with
depreciating land value and shrinking tax revenues, suburban municipalities would be under greater
financial and logistical strain to provide residents with core services.
1 These estimates are based on treating additional transportation costs as a City Wage Tax increase. An alternative method – based on the city tax on
gross receipts – is also addressed later in the text.
EMBARGOED UNTIL 5/18/07
May 2007
Economy League of Greater Philadelphia 2
ISSUE BACKGROUND
As of early May 2007, SEPTA has a budget shortfall of $129.6 million.  Without a source of funding that
can balance the transit organization's budget this summer, SEPTA will  be forced to implement "Plan B,"
which will cut service by 20 percent and increase fares by 31 percent.
Budget crises have become a regular occurrence at SEPTA, so much so that threats of service cuts and
fare increases have begun to fall on deaf ears. In the past, crises have somehow been averted, staving
off  drastic  service  cuts  and  fare  increases  by  way  of  short-term  funding  fixes  and  causing  many  to
wonder whether SEPTA’s budget gaps are a crisis at all. In recent years, however, shortfalls have grown
to the point where short-term solutions are no longer available.
Operating Efficiency
SEPTA has responded to increasing shortfalls by improving operational efficiency. Over the past decade,
SEPTA has strategically reduced headcount while at the same time increasing worker productivity. Since
1996, SEPTA has reduced its headcount by 14 percent while increasing its vehicle revenue miles per
employee, an industry standard of productivity, by 45 percent.
Figure 1
SEPTA Operating Efficiency
FY 1996-2006
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000
11,000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Fiscal Year
Actual Headcount
Vehicle Revenue Miles Per Employee
As a result, SEPTA operates at a level of efficiency that ranks among the top performing systems in the
United States. In 2005, SEPTA ranked fifth among large U.S. transit agencies in fare recovery, an industry
standard of operational efficiency. At 41.9 percent,2 SEPTA  had  the  highest  ratio  of  fare  receipts  to
operating expenses of any major transit system in the country not operating in New Jersey or New York.
By comparison, SEPTA’s peer systems, Washington, D.C.’s Metro, the Chicago Transit Authority, and
Boston’s “T” fared worse, posting 41.8 percent, 40.6 percent, and 29.0 percent fare recovery ratios
respectively. In other words, the Metro, CTA, and “T” each required a higher proportion of expenses to
be covered by government subsidies than did SEPTA.
2 SEPTA's enabling legislation requires that no less than half of SEPTA's budget be funded through operating revenue. For this purpose, the
Commonwealth has defined operating revenue to include passenger revenue, senior citizen free transportation, shared ride program, investment
income, other income, asset maintenance and route guarantees. Also for the purpose, the Commonwealth excludes depreciation from operating
expenses. For Fiscal Year 2005, SEPTA's operating ratio was 51.74 percent.
Source: SEPTA
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Table 1
Fare Receipts as a Percent of Operating Expenses3
FY 2005
System Region Fare Recovery
MTA Metro-North Commuter Railroad New York 54.8%
MTA New York City Transit New York 53.1%
MTA Long Island Railroad New York 44.6%
New Jersey Transit NJ (State) 44.6%
SEPTA Philadelphia 41.9%
CTA Chicago 41.8%
Metra Chicago 40.7%
Metro Transit Twin Cities 40.7%
WMATA Washington, D.C. 40.6%
PATH New York 32.2%
MBTA Boston 29.0%
MTA Maryland Baltimore 28.7%
MARTA Atlanta 27.4%
LACMTA Los Angeles 27.3%
Miami-Dade Transit Miami 25.0%
PAAC Pittsburgh 24.1%
MUNI San Francisco 22.3%
MTA of Harris County Houston 21.3%
King County Transit Seattle 21.2%
Tri-County Metropolitan District of Oregon Portland 20.8%
RTD Denver 18.2%
Service Area
SEPTA has maintained this comparatively high level of operational efficiency despite being asked to serve
more people over a larger area. Since 1996, SEPTA’s regional rail ridership has grown by 35 percent,
reflecting the expansion of its service area. This increase is due in part to a nationwide trend of “reverse
commuting” in which workers commute from their homes in the city out to reach suburban jobs.
Figure 2
Suburban Transit and Regional Rail Ridership
FY 1996-2006
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3 Pennsylvania Transit Coalition (2005). Available at: <http://www.patransit.org/information/funding.htm>.
Source: SEPTA
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The growth of reverse commuting is expected to continue over the next 25 years as each suburban
county continues to develop and is projecting double-digit job growth. For SEPTA, suburban job growth is
potentially costly, requiring more vehicles to traverse a greater distance. However, SEPTA’s track record
of consistently high levels of operational efficiency suggests effectiveness in adapting to regional growth
patterns.
Figure 3
Projected Employment Level Change by County
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Cost Control
Sharp increases in specific operating expense items have also been a cause for concern. Across the
country, health care and fuel costs have skyrocketed in recent years, resulting in budget shortfalls at
transit agencies and private sector businesses nationwide. At SEPTA, fringe benefits, which account for a
quarter of the agency’s billion-dollar budget, have increased by 24 percent over the past four years. Fuel
costs, which account for 4 percent of the budget, have nearly tripled during that period.
Despite rising health care and fuel costs, SEPTA has managed to control overall operating expenditures.
When adjusted for inflation, the size of SEPTA’s operating budget has increased just 4.5 percent over the
past decade, thanks in large part to efficiencies realized in other expenses, such as injuries and damages
claims as well as workers compensation expenses.
Figure 4
Operating Expenses in 2006 Dollars
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Source: DVRPC
Source: SEPTA
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Thus, while increased expenses have contributed to SEPTA’s operating budget shortfalls, they have
played a relatively small role. Rather, the biggest culprit has been lagging growth in dedicated funds,
which have failed to meet even modest projections.
Figure 5
History of Act 26 Dedicated Funding
FY 1992-2007
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Short-Term Fixes
As  budget  shortfalls  have  increased,  SEPTA  has  been  forced  to  use  a  series  of  stopgap  measures  to
maintain operations.
? In 2002, SEPTA passed a 12 percent fare increase, worth $32 million per year.
? In 2003, SEPTA began transferring $40 million of its dedicated capital dollars to cover operating
costs. It has done so each year since.
? In 2004, SEPTA transferred another $11 million from its federal capital funds to cover additional
operating needs. In the same year, the state restored a previously cut portion of its subsidy,
worth $15 million per year.
? In  2005,  Governor  Rendell  flexed  $412  million  in  federal  highway  funds  to  cover  all  of
Pennsylvania’s transit budget shortfalls. SEPTA received the majority of these dollars. However,
flexed funds expired in December of 2006, leaving SEPTA with a $37 million shortfall for FY2007.
? In  March  of  2007,  SEPTA  closed  its  FY2007  gap  transferring  another  $37  million  from  capital
projects. In total, one-fifth, or nearly $200 million, of SEPTA’s operating budget is currently being
funded by fixes instituted in the last half-decade.
Short-term fixes are an unsustainable way to cover operating expenses. Years of this practice have
backed SEPTA into a corner from which it now has no escape. Facing a $129.6 million budget shortfall for
its coming fiscal year, SEPTA must pass a balanced budget by June 30. To make matters worse, millions
of capital dollars transferred away from projects have created an enormous backlog of critically important
system maintenance. Continuing to defer maintenance will cripple the system.
Actual Funding
Initial projection
If funding grew
with inflation
Source: SEPTA
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Transit Investments in Other Regions
While  SEPTA  faces  an  enormous  budget  crisis  and  has  been  forced  to  transfer  capital  dollars  to  cover
operating expenses, the nation is experiencing a boom in transit capital investment. Regions across the
country that compete with Greater Philadelphia for jobs and people have invested tens of billions in the
last decade to build transit systems similar to the one Philadelphia already has.
Denver. Over the past six years, two transit projects – one voter approved – have been initiated in the
Denver region. Combined, they total $6.4 billion and promise over 100 miles of light rail.
Phoenix. Voters in the Phoenix region have approved a half-cent sales tax that will provide $8.5 billion
over 20 years for new transit lines.
Houston. Voters in the Houston region approved a $7.5 billion bonding program to pay for 73 miles of
new transit lines.
Dallas. Voters  in  the Dallas  region have approved $2.4 billion to  double  the size  of  its  rail  network by
2013. Construction has already sparked more than $1 billion in development around new transit
corridors.
San Francisco. Voters in the Bay Area approved a half-cent sales tax across multiple counties that will
provide $2.35 billion over 30 years for transit-related improvements across the region.
Closer to home, older regions in the Northeast Corridor with established transit systems are spending
billions on upgrades and expansion.
New Jersey. New Jersey Transit recently completed the RiverLINE, connecting Trenton and Camden
with a light rail line along the Delaware River. In the northern part of the state, New Jersey Transit has
also recently completed a new terminal called Secaucus Junction and the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail line.
New York. The Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) has received tens of billions in recent years to bring
the New York subway system to a complete state of good repair. Additionally, the Long Island Railroad,
which feeds into Penn Station, is currently in the planning stages for building a connection to New York’s
other rail hub, Grand Central Station.
Figure 6
Recent Budget Shortfalls and Sources of Fixes
FY 2002-2007
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Boston. The state recently approved funding for a $610 million extension of the Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority’s Green Line. Due for completion in 2013, the new portion of the Green Line will
connect established inner-ring suburban communities Somerville and Medford with North Station, the
city, and the rest of the region.
Baltimore. The Maryland Transit Administration has recently upgraded Baltimore’s fare collection system
and has developed plans for expansion of the region’s light rail network.
Washington, D.C. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority is planning an expansion of its
MetroRail system to provide better connectivity with suburban Maryland and Virginia.
Transit Investments in Southeastern Pennsylvania
Over the past two decades, SEPTA has spent $5.2 billion towards significant renewal of its infrastructure.
Investments have included rehabilitation of the Market-Frankford Elevated line for $1.9 billion,
construction of the Center City Commuter Tunnel and Market East Station for $365 million, construction
of the R1 Airport line for $89 million, and restoration of the Route 15 trolley along Girard Avenue for $78
million. Hundreds of millions more have been spent to upgrade safety signals, stations, bridges, tracks,
and rolling stock.
Table 2
SEPTA Major Capital Projects
FY 1986-2007
Project Investment ($M)
Market-Frankford Line Infrastructure, Stations & Cars 1,897.0
Acquisition of 1,400 Buses / Trackless Trolleys (Last 12 Years) 370.0
Center City Commuter Tunnel / Market East Station 365.0
Commuter Rail Bridges, Track, Signals & Power (Center City to
Glenside, Montgomery County) 285.0
Broad Street Subway Line Cars & Signal System 193.0
Subway Surface & Media Sharon Hill Light Rail Vehicles &
Shops 137.0
Route 100 Norristown High Speed Line Infrastructure, Shop &
Vehicles 136.0
R1 Airport Line Construction 89.0
New Bus Shops - Allegheny & Midvale 83.0
Route 15 Trolley Service Restoration 78.0
Suburban Station Improvements 63.0
SEPTA’s  investments  have put  the system in  a  position where it  can serve Greater  Philadelphia  with a
level of service that is the goal of virtually every region in the country. It has also sparked hundreds of
millions in private investment. Both the Comcast Center and Cira Centre have been built with direct
pedestrian connections to Suburban Station and 30th Street Station, SEPTA’s two largest rail hubs.
Due to the size of the SEPTA’s transit infrastructure, significant investment is required simply to offset
depreciation of the system. Yet, while other regions are investing billions to develop transit infrastructure
like that which our region already has, year after year SEPTA is forced to transfer dollars from capital
projects to fund its operating expenses. Deferral of much-needed maintenance has put the region’s
transit investments at risk. Further disinvestment will reduce the attractiveness, usefulness, and
ultimately, the value of the region’s transit infrastructure.
Statewide Transportation Funding Crisis
SEPTA’s current crisis is an indicator of the state’s failure to provide adequate and sustainable funding for
its entire transportation portfolio. In 2005, Governor Rendell created the Pennsylvania Transportation
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Funding and Reform Commission, a bi-partisan group with legislative representation, to assess the extent
of the crisis created by this failure and to provide recommendations for reform. The commission found
SEPTA to operate at a relatively high level of operational efficiency, but that the agency severely lacks
from stable funding and long-term planning. Auditors concluded, “SEPTA’s need of government subsidies
for operating and capital for existing and expanded service are significant.”4
Concurrently, the then Republican-led House Transportation Committee conducted an independent
review of SEPTA, which found SEPTA to compare well with its peers in measures of operating efficiency,
but that fundamental changes were needed to its funding structure. Auditors concluded, “SEPTA can do
little more than it does now until its financial environment changes.”5 Over one-dozen audits in the past
year have agreed, finding that SEPTA has done what it can with limited resources, and that fundamental
flaws in the system’s funding must be fixed if SEPTA is to improve its service in the region.
The work of the Transportation Funding and Reform Commission shaped what has become a statewide
transportation funding debate. The Commission set the statewide transportation funding need at $1.7
billion, including $965 million for highways and bridges and $760 million for transit. To close the highway
and bridge funding gap, the Commission recommended a 12-cent gas tax hike and increases to various
motor vehicle fees. To close the transit funding gap, the Commission recommended implementing a
combination of state and local taxes that would provide an additional $258 million for operating expenses
and $502 for capital projects. The Commission also recommended reforms to the transit funding process,
including an increase of the local share, establishment of a new state transit dedicated trust fund, and
consolidation of current state transit funding programs.
Governor Rendell responded to the Commission’s recommendations with a set of his own funding
measures. Unwilling to either flex highway funds or levy a tax on state residents, Rendell proposed
funding highway and bridge needs by leasing the Pennsylvania Turnpike and funding transit needs by
levying a new tax on oil  company gross  profits.  In  statements  since rolling out  his  proposal,  Governor
Rendell has backed off his rigid stance against flexing highway dollars, but stressed that he would only
provide a flex with a long-term, sustainable funding solution in place. He also indicated a willingness to
accommodate alternatives, and that the most important objective at this time is to simply “do something”
to fix the failed system of statewide transportation funding.
SEPTA’s FY2008 Operating Budget Proposals
In the meantime,  SEPTA has proposed a pair  of  budget  scenarios  for  closing its  $129.6 million budget
shortfall  for  fiscal  year  2008.  “Plan A”  is  predicated on $100 million in  new state funding and calls  for
generating the additional $29 million from an 11 percent fare increase. Plan A represents an effort by
SEPTA to achieve a level of financial stability without compromising the integrity of the region’s transit
network. SEPTA has not enacted a fare increase since 2001, and the 11 percent increase would in part
account for 18 percent inflation accrued since that time. More importantly from the region’s standpoint,
Plan A calls for maintaining its breadth and level of service, stating only that SEPTA will pursue marginal
efficiency gains wherever possible to further trim operating expenses.
“Plan  B”,  on  the  other  hand,  assumes  no  additional  state  funding  and  would  close  the  $129.6  million
funding  gap  by  slashing  service  by  20  percent  and  increasing  fares  by  31  percent.  Unlike  Plan  A,  this
budget proposal would raise fares well above the rate of inflation and dramatically alter SEPTA’s breadth
and level of service. If implemented, Plan B would have a profound effect on the regional economy. The
Economy League set out to quantify that impact.
4 Investing in Our Future: Addressing Pennsylvania’s Transportation Funding Crisis (2007) Final Report. Transit Agency Operational Audit of SEPTA.
Pennsylvania Transportation Funding and Reform Commission. January. Available at:
<http://www.dot.state.pa.us/Internet/pdCommissCommitt.nsf/HomePageTransFundReformComm?OpenForm>.
5 A Study of the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (2006) Final Report. Pennsylvania House of Representatives Transportation
Committee. 4 October. Available at: <http:// gw_pahouseit_district079.psinternal.net/uploads/SEPTA_FinalReport.pdf>.
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Table 3
Proposed Fare Increases
FY 2008
Present Plan A: 11% Plan B: 31%
Cash $2.00 $2.00 $2.50
Token $1.30 $1.45 $1.80
Transfer $0.60 $0.75 $0.80
Weekly TransPass $18.75 $21.00 $25.00
Tran
sit
Monthly TransPass $70.00 $79.00 $95.00
Zone 1
Off Peak $3.00 $3.50 $4.00
Peak $3.00 $3.50 $4.00
Zone 2
Off Peak $3.00 $3.50 $5.00
Peak $3.75 $4.25 $5.00
Weekly $28.25 $31.50 $38.00
Monthly $106.00 $116.00 $143.50
Zone 3
Off Peak $3.75 $4.25 $5.50
Peak $4.50 $5.00 $5.50
Weekly $34.50 $39.00 $45.00
Monthly $126.50 $142.50 $165.00
Zone 4
Off Peak $4.25 $4.75 $6.25
Peak $5.00 $5.50 $6.25
Weekly $39.50 $44.50 $52.00
Monthly $145.00 $163.00 $187.50
Zone 5
Off Peak $4.25 $4.75 $6.75
Peak $5.50 $6.00 $6.75
Weekly $45.50 $50.50 $58.50
Monthly $163.00 $181.00 $212.50
Zone 6
Off Peak $7.00 $8.00 $8.50
R
eg
ional R
ail
Peak $7.00 $8.00 $8.50
Plan B Proposed Service Cuts
Weekday Service. All scheduled weekday service is reduced by 20 percent on the following routes noted below.  In
most cases, headways (service frequency) would be widened to reduce service expenses by 20 percent.  Wherever
possible, trips proposed for suspension would be those impacting the fewest passengers.  Externally funded service is
exempt from service reductions, except the JARC funded services, which face the possibility of discontinuation.
? City Transit Division: C, G, H, J, K, L, R, XH, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 47m, 48, 50,
52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 73, 75, 77, 79, 80, 84, 88, 89, 121, 400-
Series, Market-Frankford & Broad Street Lines
? Suburban Transit and Contract Operations: 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,
106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129,
130, 131, 132, 150, 201, 206, 310 (Horsham Breeze) and 312 (Cornwells Heights Parking Shuttle)
? Regional Rail Division: R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R7 and R8
Weekend Service. Modified Sunday service levels will be operated on Saturdays on the following routes:
? City Transit Division: C, G, H, J, K, L, R, XH, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 47m, 48, 50, 52, 53,
54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 73, 75, 77, 79, 84, 88, 89, Market-Frankford & Broad
Street Lines
? Suburban Transit and Contract Operations: 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 108, 109, 110, 113,
114, 117, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125 and 130
? Regional Rail Division: R1, R2, R3, R5, R6, R7 and R8
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ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Implementation of Plan B would have a significant impact on the regional economy, imposing costs on
individuals, businesses, and governments across Greater Philadelphia. Consequences of service cuts and
fare increases would manifest in several forms. This analysis groups impacts into three categories:
mobility, government services, and regional competitiveness.
Mobility
Service cuts and fare increases would compromise mobility by increasing the cost and time required for
transit riders and drivers to move about the region.
Impact on Current Transit Riders
Increased costs to existing transit riders would be realized in three forms: 1) higher fares if they continue
to ride SEPTA; 2) time costs incurred from longer wait times for buses, trolleys, and trains; and 3) private
costs of owning and using a car if they switch to driving.
Higher fares. The majority of current transit riders would continue to rely on SEPTA. Many, however,
would find a commuting alternative. Industry-accepted elasticities6 for fare and service alterations were
assigned to estimate the proportion of current ridership7 that would stop riding SEPTA due to Plan B fare
increases and service cuts. From this, it is estimated that SEPTA would experience a 9.9 percent decrease
in ridership, resulting in 29.6 million fewer trips per year.
The remaining users would pay the 31 percent higher fares. To calculate the total cost of fare increases
to transit riders, the current ridership multiplied by the current average fare was subtracted from the
projected number of remaining riders multiplied by the higher fare level. Based on this calculation,
despite almost 30 million fewer trips per year, SEPTA would bring in almost $68.1 million more in fares, a
cost fully borne by transit riders.
Longer wait times. Assuming across-the-board service cuts would equally and proportionately affect
wait times, the industry-accepted transportation time valuation of 40 percent of median income was
applied to the five-county region weighted median income of $54,9318 to determine the impact of longer
wait times. Based on this calculation, the total cost of longer waits would be $91.9 million per year.
It  is  important  to  note that  this  total  does not  include extra  waiting time associated with Regional  Rail
lines, conservatively assuming that people do not wait for those lines but are instead making travel plans
based on the preset schedules.
Switch to driving. Not every transit refugee would become a new driver. Conservatively, it is estimated
that 30 percent of the nearly 30 million lost transit riders would choose instead to drive, and that each
former transit rider does not necessarily require a car to themselves, but rather that there will be 1.5
people per car. Utilizing estimates of mileage per trip (which differs by transit mode) in conjunction with
estimates of the full cost per mile of auto travel (including both capital and operating), it is estimated that
leaving SEPTA and choosing to drive would cost commuters $17.6 million per year.
Additionally, it is estimated that 20 percent of new car trips would involve new parking costs. Multiplied
by the per-trip parking rate (described on the next page), it is estimated that new drivers would pay
$15.6 million per year to park.9 From these new driving costs, $11.2 million is subtracted to account for
transit fare savings. Based on these calculations, the total cost to former transit riders choosing to drive
would be $22.0 million per year.
6 Industry-accepted elasticities for fare and service changes are -0.3 and 0.03 respectively.
7 Based on data provided by SEPTA for fiscal year 2005.
8 The weighted median income was calculated by inflating 2004 U.S. Census income data by 3 percent per year and weighting Bucks, Chester,
Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia County median incomes by population.
9 The assumptions used with respect to new auto travel and parking have been constructed to be consistent with DVRPC’s estimates of new Center
City auto travel associated with the SEPTA fare increases and service cuts.
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In sum, higher fares, longer wait times, and new driving expenses would cost current transit riders an
additional $182.1 million per year. A typical transit rider would pay an additional $1.20 per day, or $438
per year. To transit riders, the impact of Plan B would be equivalent to a 30.5 percent increase in the City
Wage Tax.
Table 4
Impact on Transit Riders ($ Millions)
Cost of Fare Increases 68.0
New Driving & Parking Costs 22.0
Cost of Wait Times 92.0
TOTAL ADDITIONAL COSTS 182.0
It is important to note that these impacts do not account for value on the loss of employment caused by
workers who work unconventional hours and who have no other means of commuting to their
workplaces. The proposed service cuts include, in addition to across-the-board cuts of 20 percent,
wholesale cuts of span of service hours. The removal of these services may very well force some workers
to  quit  their  jobs  and  be  forced  to  seek  other  jobs  or  hours.  Moreover,  we  do  not  include  any
“scheduling” costs for the adjustments that Regional Rail riders must make in response to the reduced
frequencies and hours of service.
Impact on Current Drivers
Increased costs to existing transit riders would be realized in two forms: 1) increased travel time due to
congestion; and 2) higher parking prices in Center City.
Increased congestion. The introduction of  new cars  on the road as a  result  of  former transit  riders
deciding to drive would increase congestion for existing drivers. Employing DVRPC’s congestion model, it
is estimated that the implementation of Plan B service cuts and fare increases would cause the average
speed of auto travel across Southeastern Pennsylvania to drop from 29.7 miles per hour to 29.6 miles per
hour. Applied over the 2.55 million hours of current daily vehicle use, this seemingly small change implies
a considerable increase of over 8,500 hours in travel time per day. In reality, the impact on congestion
will vary greatly across the region. It is expected that commuters on major arterials, such as I-95, I-76,
and Broad Street would experience significant declines in speed and increase in travel time, while drivers
on some other roads would experience no impact at all. The aggregate effect, however, would be
significant.
To determine the cost of increased congestion, the industry standard transportation time valuation of 40
percent of the median income earned in the five-county area was multiplied by the estimated increase in
travel time. Based on this calculation, the net cost to current drivers of additional time in traffic would be
$24.5 million per year. It is important to note that increased motor vehicle travel time would also produce
negative environmental impacts, such as increased carbon emissions, that are not quantified in this study
but would be significant.
Higher parking prices. Thousands of new drivers would require a place to park their cars. Supply and
demand theory dictates that this will provide the impetus for Center City parking lots to increase prices.
To calculate how much prices will increase, it is estimated that 80 percent of Center City’s 65,000 parking
spaces are occupied on a typical weekday. Recent studies have reported that the current average price
for Center City parking is $12.16.
DVRPC estimates that Plan B service cuts and fare increases would increase the number of parkers in
Center  City  by  4,537  per  weekday.  Based  on  linear  demand  and  supply  functions  and  applying  the
industry standard price elasticity for parking,10 increased demand on weekdays for Center City parking
would increase prices by $1.06 to $13.22. This estimate can be characterized as extremely conservative
10 The industry-accepted national price elasticity for parking is -0.2.
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because it  assumes unitary  elasticity  of  supply  of  parking,  and it  is  doubtful  that  supply  will  so  readily
adjust to demand. Nevertheless, based on these calculations current drivers would pay an additional
$14.4 million per year to park in Center City.
In sum, increased congestion and higher parking prices would cost current drivers an additional $38.9
million per year. Commuters to Center City would pay an additional $1.06 per day, or $265 per year11 to
park. To a typical suburban resident driving into Center City for work, increased parking prices would be
equivalent to a 21 percent increase in the Commuter Wage Tax.
Table 5
Impact on Existing Drivers ($ Millions)
Cost of Additional Commute Time 24.5
Cost of Parking Price Increases 14.4
TOTAL ADDITIONAL COSTS 38.9
While significant, it is likely that estimated economic impacts actually understate the full compliment of
mobility costs associated with Plan B. For one, anticipated congestion increases were generated from
very conservative traffic estimates and are unlikely to assess the full impact of service cuts and fare
increases on the region’s roadways. More significantly, estimates do not address inevitable long-term
behavioral adjustments, such as the purchase of another car or relocation. Such lifestyle changes would
have a compounding effect on economic impacts.
Regional Competitiveness
Reduced mobility would damage the regional business climate. Companies that decide to remain in the
region could need to compensate employees for increased commuting costs. Additionally, employers
could expect a decline in workforce productivity as it becomes more difficult to get to work. On the other
hand, many employers would decide to relocate outside of the region. This is a costly proposition in itself.
Moreover, service cuts and fare increases would compromise two key indicators of regional
competitiveness in two ways: 1) employment level; and 2) property values.
Impact on Employment
Increases in the cost of transportation are not unlike a tax, serving as an additional cost associated with
living and working in the region. Based on this analogy, impacts of Plan B on regional employment were
estimated based on models utilizing two separate methodologies: 1) the Wage Tax model, which equates
additional  transportation  costs  to  an  increased  tax  on  wages;  and  2)  the  tax  on  gross  receipts  model,
which equates additional transportation costs with increased taxes on businesses.
Wage tax model. According  to  a  2003  study  prepared  by  Econsult  for  the  Philadelphia  Tax  Reform
Commission,  the  lower  end  of  the  range  of  employment  loss  resulting  from a  $125  million  Wage  Tax
increase is 31,000 jobs.12 Assuming that 80 percent of the $220 million in additional transportation costs
borne would be absorbed by the city, the city would lose 43,800 jobs. Assuming that two-thirds of jobs
lost by the city would be retained somewhere else in the region and that one-third of these jobs would
leave the region or disappear altogether, the region would lose 14,500 jobs. Based on median incomes
for the city and region,13 these employment impacts represent an aggregate loss of $1.67 billion in city
earnings and $868.5 million in regional earnings.
Gross receipts model. According to the same work prepared for the Philadelphia Tax Reform
Commission, the lower end of the range of employment loss resulting from a $125 million tax increase on
gross receipts is 24,100 jobs. Assuming again that 80 percent of additional transportation costs would be
11 Assumes 250 annual workdays.
12 Employment impact estimates are for the year 2010.
13 Median incomes are projected for the year 2010.
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absorbed by the city, the city would lose 34,100 jobs. Assuming again that two-thirds of jobs lost by the
city would be retained somewhere else in the region and that one-third of these jobs would leave the
region or disappear altogether, the region would lose 11,200 jobs. Based on median incomes for the city
and region, these employment impacts represent an aggregate loss of $1.3 billion in city earnings and
$675.2 million in regional earnings.
Table 6
Impact on Employment
Wage Tax Model City Region
Employment (43,800) (14,500)
Earnings ($ Millions) (1,665.8) (868.5)
Gross Receipts Model City Region
Employment (34,100) (11,200)
Earnings ($ Millions) (1,295.0) (675.2)
Impact on Property Values
Increased transportation costs would have a depreciating effect on property values in both the city and
suburbs.14
City property values. According to the previous work prepared for the Philadelphia Tax Reform
Commission by Econsult, the supply side impact of a $125 million Wage Tax cut would be a 4.6 percent
increase in residential property values. From this, assuming that 80 percent of additional transportation
costs borne are absorbed by the city, the combined $220 million additional transportation cost to current
drivers and transit riders would translate into a 6.5 percent decrease in city property values, a $2.89
billion reduction in cumulative value. Based on median city home values, the typical city house would lose
$7,431 in value. In an effort to obtain conservative estimates, calculations for city property value impacts
only utilize the Wage Tax model; utilizing the gross receipts model yields a significantly higher rate of
depreciation.15
Table 7
Impact on City Property Values
Model Wage Tax
Percent Change (6.5)
Cumulative Value ($ Millions) (2,893.0)
Impact on Typical House ($) (7,431)
Suburban property values. Previous research16 has demonstrated that job loss in Philadelphia has a
direct effect on suburban residential property values, especially those in close proximity of the city.
Utilizing the Wage Tax model  and applying city  job loss  estimates to  previously  generated models,  the
combined $220 million additional transportation cost to current drivers and transit riders would translate
into a 6.6 percent depreciation of suburban property values, a $4.45 billion reduction in cumulative value.
Based on median suburban home values, the typical suburban house would lose $6,867 in value.
Alternatively, it is also acceptable to employ the gross receipts model for estimating the impact on
suburban property values. In this case, additional transportation costs would translate into a 5.1 percent
depreciation of suburban property values, a $3.5 billion reduction in cumulative value, or $5,339 per
home.
14 Note that property value impacts occur over time, and since prices basically always rise over time, one would not observe a direct fall, but rather
slower appreciation than would otherwise occur, ultimately resulting in diminished property value compared to what otherwise would have occurred.
15 The supply side impact of a $125 gross receipts tax cut would be a 17.0 percent increase in property values.
16 Source:  “The Suburban Housing Market: The Effects of City and Suburban Employment Growth,” (1999) Real Estate Economics, Vol. 27, No. 4.
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Table 8
Impact on Suburban Property Values
Model Wage Tax Gross Receipts
Percent Change (6.6) (5.1)
Cumulative Value ($ Millions) (4,452.0) (3,461.0)
Impact on Typical House ($) (6,867) (5,339)
Government Services
Job loss and depreciating property values would diminish the regional tax base, thereby decreasing
government revenues. The impact would be felt on municipal, school district, and state coffers.
Impact on Local Government
Implementation of Plan B would create a gap in the city budget. Treating additional transportation costs
as a Wage Tax increase, $1.67 billion in city earnings lost would result in a $60.6 million reduction of City
Wage Tax revenues per year.17 Alternatively, treating additional transportation costs as a tax increase on
gross receipts,  city  earnings lost  would result  in  a  $47.0 million reduction of  City  Wage Tax revenues.
Either way, service cuts and fare increases would approximately halve the anticipated $106 million in
projected new revenue from casino gambling.
Depreciating property values – estimated at 6.5 percent in the city and between 5.1 and 6.6 percent in
the  suburbs  –  would  negatively  impact  school  districts,  which  rely  on  property  taxes  as  a  source  of
revenue. The resulting budget strain could necessitate tax rate hikes to account for lost revenue.
Outer-ring suburbs would realize additional impacts. Service cuts and fare increases would have a
decentralizing effect, pushing development away from the region’s core and towards the urban fringe.
Already strained by depreciating land values, sprawling growth patterns would require municipalities to
provide utilities such as power lines, water pipes, and sewage systems across a larger area and to build
roads and bridges to connect new developments, all of which would require regular maintenance. These
obligations could create an unsustainable governing environment for suburban municipalities.
Impact on State Government
Regional  earnings  loss  would  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  state  economy,  as  the  five  counties  of
Southeastern Pennsylvania comprise one-third of the state’s Personal Income Tax base. Treating
additional transportation costs as a Wage Tax increase, $868 million in regional earnings lost would result
in a $27 million reduction of state Personal Income Tax revenues per year. Alternatively, treating
additional transportation costs as an tax increase on gross receipts, regional earnings lost would result in
a $20.7 million reduction of Personal Income Tax revenues per year.
17 Estimate utilizes the FY2010 forecasted City Wage Tax rate of 3.6269 percent, which accounts for anticipated state tax reform.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
 “At a time when personal vehicle use continues to soar without corresponding highway
expansion, and fuel prices and supplies are held hostage to world-wide events, it is
simply unthinkable to let public transit collapse.”18
-Pennsylvania Transportation Funding and Reform Commission
Service cuts and fare increases will have different impacts across the region. Some people will experience
greater consequences than others. The groups most impacted will be shift-based employees who rely on
odd-hour public transportation service, which Plan B will severely cut. Early morning, post 8 p.m., and
weekend service cuts will have a profound impact on the ability for these workers to commute. Janitors,
security officers, health care workers, hotel attendants, and many others who work odd-hour shifts will
have to find a new way to get to their jobs. Some may be forced to find a new job altogether.
While some people will experience impacts more acutely, service cuts and fare increases will have an
impact on everyone in the region. Workers will have a harder time finding – and getting to – jobs. Crucial
sectors will be understaffed. Some businesses and residents will relocate. Home values will fall.
Government services will be squeezed. Kids will have more trouble getting to school. Families will spend
less time together. Older residents and non-drivers’ life choices will be limited. The region will be a less
attractive place to live and work.
This could be Greater Philadelphia’s future, but it does not have to be. Growing regions have recognized
the benefits of investing in public transit. Neighboring regions are investing billions in transit
infrastructure as well.
What will be our future?
18 Investing in Our Future, Ch. 2, P. 17.
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ABOUT THE ECONOMY LEAGUE OF GREATER PHILADELPHIA
The Economy League of Greater Philadelphia is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization
dedicated to research and analysis of the region's resources and challenges with the goal of promoting
sound public policy and increasing the region's prosperity.  To learn more about the Economy League and
its work, visit: www.economyleague.org.
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